Tag Archives: cyberdefense

Smart and Sensitive: the Power Grid

Raytheon Company  and Utilidata have formed a strategic alliance to help power utilities proactively detect, defend against and respond to cyber threats.  The effort will combine Utilidata’s experience in the use of real-time data from the electrical grid to detect and respond to cyber attacks and Raytheon’s expertise in proactive cyber threat hunting, automation and managed security services to provide world-class cybersecurity, analytics and other innovative technologies….

[According to] Scott DePasquale, chairman and CEO of Utilidata. “With more and more devices and systems connected to the internet, and all of them needing electrical power, these challenges are increasing exponentially. This new alliance will help define the future of cybersecurity in the power utilities sector.”  In December 2015, a cyber attack shut down a large section of the Ukrainian power grid – an incident that the Department of Energy identified in the 2017 installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review as an ‘indicator of what is possible.’

Excerpts from  Raytheon, Utilidata to deliver defense-grade cybersecurity for utilities, PRNewswire, Feb. 8, 2017

Needles and Haystack and Beyond: DARPA

Using fine powder and a brush to reveal and copy fingerprints. image from wikipedia

From DARPA pdf document available at  FedBizOpps. Gov Enhanced Attribution
Solicitation Number: DARPA-BAA-16-34

Malicious actors in cyberspace currently operate with little fear of being caught due to the fact that it is extremely difficult, in some cases perhaps even impossible, to reliably and confidently attribute actions in cyberspace to individuals. The reason cyber attribution is difficult stems at least in part from a lack of end-to-end accountability in the current Internet infrastructure…..The identities of malicious cyber operators are largely obstructed by the use of multiple layers of indirection… The lack of detailed information about the actions and identities of the adversary cyber operators inhibits policymaker considerations and decisions for both cyber and non-cyber response options (e.g., economic sanctions under EO-13694).

The DARPA’s Enhanced Attribution program aims to make currently opaque malicious cyber adversary actions and individual cyber operator attribution transparent by providing high-fidelity visibility into all aspects of malicious cyber operator actions and to increase the Government’s ability to publicly reveal the actions of individual malicious cyber operators without damaging sources and methods….

The program seeks to develop:

–technologies to extract behavioral and physical biometrics from a range of devices and
vantage points to consistently identify virtual personas and individual malicious cyber
operators over time and across different endpoint devices and C2 infrastructures;
–techniques to decompose the software tools and actions of malicious cyber operators into
semantically rich and compressed knowledge representations;
–scalable techniques to fuse, manage, and project such ground-truth information over time,
toward developing a full historical and current picture of malicious activity;–algorithms for developing predictive behavioral profiles within the context of cyber campaigns; and
–technologies for validating and perhaps enriching this knowledge base with other sources
of data, including public and commercial sources of information.

Excerpts from Enhanced Attribution, Solicitation Number: DARPA-BAA-16-34, April 22, 2016

How to Forecast a Cyber Atttack: IARPA cyber intelligence

DDoS Stachledraht attack. Image from wikipedia

From the website of IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) — a US research agency under the Director of National Intelligence.

“Approaches to cyber defense typically focus on post-mortem analysis of the various attack vectors utilized by adversaries. As attacks have evolved and increased over the years, established approaches (e.g., signature-based detection, anomaly detection) have not adequately enabled cybersecurity practitioners to get ahead of these threats. This has led to an industry that has invested heavily in analyzing the effects of cyber-attacks instead of analyzing and mitigating the “cause” of cyber-attacks,

The CAUSE   (Cyber-attack Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment)Program seeks to develop cyber-attack forecasting methods and detect emerging cyber phenomena to assist cyber defenders with the earliest detection of a cyber-attack (e.g., Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), successful spearphishing, successful drive-by, remote exploitation, unauthorized access, reconnaissance). The CAUSE Program aims to develop and validate unconventional multi-disciplined sensor technology (e.g., actor behavior models, black market sales) that will forecast cyber-attacks and complement existing advanced intrusion detection capabilities. Anticipated innovations include: methods to manage and extract huge amounts of streaming and batch data, the application and introduction of new and existing features from other disciplines to the cyber domain, and the development of models to generate probabilistic warnings for future cyber events. Successful proposers will combine cutting-edge research with the ability to develop robust forecasting capabilities from multiple sensors not typically used in the cyber domain…”

Excerpt from IARPA website

See also http://www.iarpa.gov/images/files/programs/cause/CAUSE_Abstracts.pdf

Automated Cyber-Security Systems: DARPA

data

From the DARPA website:

DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge takes aim at an increasingly serious problem: the inadequacy of current network security systems, which require expert programmers to identify and repair system weaknesses—typically after attackers have taken advantage of those weaknesses to steal data or disrupt processes. Such disruptions pose greater risks than ever as more and more devices, including vehicles and homes, get networked in what has become known as “the Internet of things.

“Today’s security methods involve experts working with computerized systems to identify attacks, craft corrective patches and signatures and distribute those correctives to users everywhere—a process that can take months from the time an attack is first launched,” said Mike Walker, DARPA program manager. “The only effective approach to defending against today’s ever-increasing volume and diversity of attacks is to shift to fully automated systems capable of discovering and neutralizing attacks instantly.”

To help accelerate this transition, DARPA launched the Cyber Grand Challenge, the first computer security tournament designed to test the wits of machines, not experts. The Challenge plans to follow a “capture the flag” competition format that experts have used for more than 20 years to test their cyber defense skills. That approach requires that competitors reverse engineer software created by challenge organizers and locate and heal its hidden weaknesses in a live network competition. The longest-running annual capture-the-flag challenge for experts is held at an annual conference known as DEF CON, and under the terms of a new agreement the Cyber Grand Challenge final competition is scheduled to co-locate with the DEF CON Conference in Las Vegas in 2016…

At the event, computers that have made it through a series of qualifying events over the next two years would compete head-to-head in a final tournament. Custom data visualization technology is under development to make it easy for spectators—both a live audience at the conference and anyone watching the event’s video stream worldwide—to follow the action.   Details about the Cyber Grand Challenge and some of the other registered teams can be found at www.cybergrandchallenge.com.

The Secret Bugs: Exploits

computer code

Packets of computer code, known as “exploits”, allow hackers to infiltrate or even control computers running software in which a design flaw, called a “vulnerability”, has been discovered. Criminal and, to a lesser extent, terror groups purchase exploits on more than two dozen illicit online forums or through at least a dozen clandestine brokers, says Venkatramana Subrahmanian, a University of Maryland expert in these black markets. He likens the transactions to “selling a gun to a criminal”.

Just a dozen years ago the buying and selling of illicit exploits was so rare that India’s Central Bureau of Investigation had not yet identified any criminal syndicates involved in the trade, says R.K. Raghavan, a former director of the bureau. Underground markets are now widespread, he says. Exploits empower criminals to steal data and money. Worse still, they provide cyber-firepower to hostile governments that would otherwise lack the expertise to attack an advanced country’s computer systems, worries Colonel John Adams, head of the Marine Corps’ Intelligence Integration Division in Quantico, Virginia.

Exploits themselves are generally legal. Several legitimate businesses sell them. A Massachusetts firm called Netragard last year sold more than 50 exploits to businesses and government agencies in America for prices ranging from $20,000 to more than $250,000. Adriel Desautels, Netragard’s founder, describes some of the exploits sold as “weaponised”. The firm buys a lot from three dozen independent hackers who, like clients, are carefully screened to make sure they are not selling code to anyone else, and especially not to a criminal group or unfriendly government.

More than half of exploits sold are now bought from bona fide firms rather than from freelance hackers, says Roy Lindelauf, a researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He declines to say if Dutch army or intelligence agencies buy exploits, noting that his government is still figuring out “what we’re allowed to do offensively”.Laws to ban the trade in exploits are being mooted. Marietje Schaake, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, is spearheading an effort to pass export-control laws for exploits. It is gathering support, she says, because they can be used as “digital weapons” by despotic regimes. For example, they could be used to monitor traffic on a dissident’s smartphone. However, for a handful of reasons, new laws are unlikely to be effective.

Exploits are a form of knowledge, expressed in computer code. Attempting to stop people from generating and spreading knowledge is futile, says Dave Aitel, a former computer scientist at America’s National Security Agency (NSA) who went on to found Immunity, a computer-security firm in Florida. He says that legal systems would not even agree on which code is good and which is bad. Many legal experts say code should be protected by free-speech laws—it is, after all, language expressed as strings of zeros and ones.

Moreover, tracking down exploits is hard. Hackers keep them secret so that the intended victim doesn’t identify and fix the vulnerability, thereby rendering the exploit worthless. As a French exploit developer puts it, those liable to be rapidly detected are about as useful as a “disposable gun” that can be fired just once. Secrecy surrounding the design, sale and use of exploits makes protecting computer networks from them akin to finding “unknown unknowns”, says Kenneth Geers, a cyber-security specialist at America’s Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

Several governments want firms to develop exploits. In 2010 a computer worm called Stuxnet was revealed to have attacked Iran’s nuclear kit. It used four main exploits to get in; at least one appears to have been bought rather than developed in-house by the government that launched the attack (presumably America or Israel), says David Lindahl, an IT expert at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, a government body in Stockholm. An unprecedented weapon, Stuxnet remained undetected for years by quietly erasing its tracks after “planting sabotage charges at exactly the right place” in Iran’s uranium-enrichment centrifuges, Mr Lindahl says.

Nearly all well-financed intelligence agencies buy exploits, says Eric Filiol, a lieutenant-colonel in computer intelligence for France’s army until 2009. Computer experts who years ago would reveal software vulnerabilities for mere prestige have realised that they were treating “diamonds as pebbles”, says Mr Filiol, now head of the Operational Cryptography and Computer Virology Lab in Laval. His lab is partly financed by France’s defence ministry to provide it with exploits.

The price of exploits has risen more than fivefold since 2004, Mr Filiol says, referring to a confidential document. They vary greatly, depending on three main factors: how hard the exploit is to develop; the number of computers to which it provides access; and the value of those computers. An exploit that can stealthily provide administrator privileges to a distant computer running Windows XP, a no-longer-fashionable operating system, costs only about $40,000. An exploit for Internet Explorer, a popular browser, can cost as much as $500,000 (see chart).

Software firms also buy exploits to identify and repair vulnerabilities in their products before others take advantage of them. A small Vancouver firm called Tarsnap, for example, has paid 30 people who pointed out flaws in its encryption software for online PC backups. To develop better defences for its clients’ computer systems, HP, an American giant, has spent more than $7m since 2005 buying hundreds of “zero days”, as undiscovered exploits are also known in hacker slang. (Once discovered, an exploit’s days are numbered, literally: it becomes a “one day”, then a “two day”, and so on until the vulnerability it exploits is patched.)

Such “bug bounty” schemes, however, will struggle to compete with buyers who want to exploit rather than seal vulnerabilities. Tarsnap’s biggest payout was just $500. Last year Google offered Vupen, a French firm, $60,000 for an exploit that burrowed into its Chrome browser. Vupen’s boss, Chaouki Bekrar, balked, noting that he could get more elsewhere.

Other reputable customers, such as Western intelligence agencies, often pay higher prices. Mr Lindelauf reckons that America’s spies spend the most on exploits. Vupen and other exploit vendors decline to name their clients. However, brisk sales are partly driven by demand from defence contractors that see cyberspace as a “new battle domain”, says Matt Georgy, head of technology at Endgame, a Maryland firm that sells most of its best exploits for between $100,000 and $200,000. He laments a rise in sales by unscrupulous vendors to dangerous groups.

On March 12th the head of the Pentagon’s Cyber Command, General Keith Alexander, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that state-sponsored groups are stepping up efforts to steal and destroy data using “cybertools” purchased in illicit online markets. As an American military-intelligence official points out, governments that buy exploits are “building the black market”, thereby bankrolling dangerous R&D. For this reason, governments appear increasingly keen to develop exploits in-house. Paulo Shakarian, a cyberwar expert at West Point, an American military academy, says China appears to be moving in this direction.

Developing exploits in-house reduces the risk that a double-dealing vendor will resell code meant to be exclusive. Even so, the trade isn’t likely to fade away. When developers work out a trick that gives them control over the targeted software, they like to yell out a celebratory “who’s your daddy?” notes Pierre Roberge, boss of Arc4dia, a Quebec firm that sells exploits to spy agencies. Exploit trading will continue as long as people pay big money for the opportunity to utter the same joke—this time at the expense of a victim who has been hacked.

Cyber-security: The digital arms trade, Economist, Mar. 30, 2013, at 65.

United States Cyber Range, how to replicate the internet to test cyberweapons

Replicating the complexity of thousands of globally interconnected network systems is a challenge faced by researchers developing tools to protect our nation against the growing threat of cyber attacks. Sophisticated attacks as well as adaptive malware have the ability to devastate defense and commercial networks. DARPA was tasked by the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) to “establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing…the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions” (National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD)-54) .

Under the National Cyber Range (NCR) program, DARPA has developed the architecture and software tools for a secure, self-contained testing capability to rapidly emulate large-scale complex networks that match the depth and diversity of real-world networks. The capability, demonstrated at scale with an operational prototype, will enable realistic testing and evaluation of new cyberspace concepts, policies and technologies by the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal entities. DoD’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, released in July 2011, highlights the NCR’s role in DoD’s pursuit of revolutionary cyberspace technologies.

The NCR complements federal cyber testing capabilities by providing rapid and automated configurability and scalability for users across the government. It should provide a 5-10x reduction in the time and cost to test and evaluate new cyber tools while improving confidence in the real-world performance of these tools, a vital feature considering the extremely dynamic and evolving real-world cyber threat. The NCR is designed to allow potentially virulent code to be introduced and tested on the range without compromising the range itself. Additionally, multiple experiments will be able to run on the range simultaneously at different security levels, maximizing the range’s use across government agencies.

The NCR program began in 2009 and has been developed in three phases. The current phase (Phase II-B) will involve operation and beta testing of the prototype range; enhancing existing software tools to ensure that the range hardware and software are stable and to allow for a seamless transition; developing a business model for sustainable range operation beyond fiscal year 2012; and to transition the range and associated technologies to USCYBERCOM and other government organizations.

See DAPRA

When Governments Hack Each Other: how to steal secrets and cover your tracks

The number of cyber attacks against Chinese websites surged in 2011, rising to 8.9 million computers affected, up from 5 million in the previous year, according to a report published by China Daily.  It claimed a total of 47,000 overseas IPs were involved in the attacks, with the majority located in Japan, US and South Korea.  The report, released yesterday by China’s National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team and Coordination Center (CNCERT), found 11,851 IP addresses based overseas had gained control of 10,593 Chinese websites in 2011.  “China has become the world’s biggest victim of cyber attacks,” Zhou Yonglin, director of CNCERT’s operation department, told People’s Daily.  The report claims Japan was the source of most attacks (22.8 percent), followed closely by the United States (20.4 percent) and the Republic of Korea (7.1 percent).  Attacks ranged from wiping servers and defacing websites to stealing personal and corporate data from Chinese web users.  Although it was discovered that many hackers used Trojan programs to steal personal data, Zhou said “money is not the sole motivation”, as in several cases the hackers had intended to access state networks and steal confidential government information.  To assist damaged private websites and maintain online security, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has launched several investigations, and authorities claim they prevented the spread of online viruses 14 times last year.

People’s Republic itself has been accused several times of creating a cyber army for espionage purposes. In March last year, hackers with Internet addresses based in China launched an attack intended to steal files relating to the G20 summit held in Paris. The following October, two US satellites were discovered to have been hacked repeatedly, with evidence once again pointing at China.  Then, in November, the US Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive singled out China and Russia as the most aggressive “collectors” of American secrets. In return,China had claimed 75,000 cyber attacks it repelled in 2010 originated from US IP addresses.  It is important to note that the theoretical location of the IP address is by no means a guarantee that an attack was launched from a particular location. Hackers often use proxy servers to hide their identity, or take advantage of Tor’s anonymity network to cover their tracks.

Max Smolaks, China ‘World’s Biggest’ Cyber Attack Victim?,TechWeekEurope. Mar. 20, 2012