Tag Archives: DOD

In-Q-Tel and DOD: Opera to find needles in haystack

U.S. Department of Defense, August 21, 2013, Contracts, Air Force

Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), McLean, Va., and Signal
Innovations Group (SIG) Inc.*, Durham, N.C. are being awarded
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts for Object Physics for
Exploitation and Recognition (OPERA) to obtain the capability to isolate and
model physical mechanisms responsible for exploitation performance earlier in
the exploitation development process.  Work will be performed at McLean, Va.,
and Durham, N.C., and is expected to be completed by Aug. 21, 2020.

Excerpt From the Department of Defense Website 

The Signal Innovations Group is supported by In-Q-Tel,  the technology arm of the CIA

What can Signal Innovations Group do for the Air Force?

From Website of Signal Innovations Group

The success of military objectives and the safety of military personnel depend on the ability to detect, classify, and identify harmful objects of interest, such as military vehicles, land and sea mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Since World War II, mines have damaged more U.S. Naval vessels than all other threats combined.  Roadside bombs and other IEDs are the single greatest threat to currently deployed coalition forces, and IEDs have been responsible for almost 40% of U.S. casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

For decades, the U.S. military has been integrating advanced radar and sonar sensor systems on airborne and undersea platforms to aide in the detection, classification, and identification of air, ground, and underwater targets.  Recent growth in the development and deployment of unmanned systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), has greatly expanded the utility of multiple sensor modalities (radar, sonar, Electro-Optical (EO)/Infrared (IR) Sensors) and the quantity of collected sensor data.  Human analysts are often tasked with manually examining sensor data.  However, the overwhelming volume of data exceeds the limited available human resources, and performance is often unreliable due to human fatigue and distraction.  Therefore, automated real-time sensor processing techniques are required to reliably detect and discriminate targets of interest while minimizing the number of false alarms.  The success of automated techniques depends on the sensor system, the observed background objects, and environmental conditions, all of which can influence the performance of automated systems.  SIG has developed advanced statistical data modeling and inference techniques that accurately and efficiently detect and discriminate targets in sensor data.  By maintaining a probabilistic framework, SIG’s predictive modeling capabilities produce more meaningful and useful results than typical discrimination strategies.  Model uncertainty can be quantified to determine if additional data is necessary, decision-making is aided by confidence values associated with target declarations, and model components and values can be probabilistically combined.  As data is collected, SIG’s techniques are capable of adapting to changes in sensors and environmental conditions, as well as exploit all available data regardless of whether object identifications are known.

SIG’s target recognition software suite offers a combination of state-of-the-art detection, classification, and identification techniques that can be tailored to any application space.  The software contains multiple statistical data models within a flexible and modular architecture that is readily optimized for any sensor modality, including the fusion of multiple sensors.  The software can be configured for onboard integration with manned or unmanned platforms to provide real-time processing or delivered as stand-alone modules to support analysts and post-mission objectives.

Beyond GPS: DARPA All Source Positioning and Navigation Program

DARPA’s All Source Positioning and Navigation (ASPN) program seeks to enable low cost, robust, and seamless navigation solutions for military users on any operational platform and in any environment, with or without GPS. In particular, ASPN will develop the architectures,  abstraction methods, and navigation filtering algorithms needed for rapid integration and reconfiguration of any combination of sensors. This will enable rapid adaptation to evolving missions as well as reduction of the system integration costs and time-to-market for navigation solutions in general.

The goal of Phase 2 of ASPEN is to address the issues of optimization and real-time operation, showing capabilities beyond basic plug-and-play flexibility. Solutions must be capable of adapting to a diverse set of sensor and IMU inputs and selectively choosing the subset of measurements that produces the best possible solution, ideally mirroring the result from a tuned filter solution for that same scenario….Phase 2 solutions will need to demonstrate real-time operation in representative field (non-laboratory) environments. Although adaptability is the main goal of the ASPN program, the possibility of ASPN accuracy being substantially better than current state of art should be considered, given accommodation by ASPN of larger and more diverse sensor suites, ease of optimizing ASPN to immediate applications, and potential synergistic benefits of an open architecture.

How Easy it is to Kill: the Anonymous Drone Politics

White House counterterror chief John Brennan has seized the lead in guiding the debate on which terror leaders will be targeted for drone attacks or raids, establishing a new procedure to vet both military and CIA targets.  The move concentrates power over the use of lethal U.S. force outside war zones at the White House.

The process, which is about a month old, means Brennan’s staff consults the Pentagon, the State Department and other agencies as to who should go on the list, making a previous military-run review process in place since 2009 less relevant, according to two current and three former U.S. officials aware of the evolution in how the government targets terrorists.  In describing Brennan’s arrangement to The Associated Press, the officials provided the first detailed description of the military’s previous review process that set a schedule for killing or capturing terror leaders around the Arab world and beyond. They spoke on condition of anonymity because U.S. officials are not allowed to publicly describe the classified targeting program.

One senior administration official argues that Brennan’s move adds another layer of review that augments rather than detracts from the Pentagon’s role. The official says that in fact there will be more people at the table making the decisions, including representatives from every agency involved in counterterrorism, before they are reviewed by senior officials and ultimately the president.  The CIA’s process remains unchanged, but never included the large number of interagency players the Pentagon brought to the table for its debates.  And the move gives Brennan greater input earlier in the process, before senior officials make the final recommendation to President Barack Obama. Officials outside the White House expressed concern that drawing more of the decision-making process to Brennan’s office could turn it into a pseudo military headquarters, entrusting the fate of al-Qaida targets to a small number of senior officials.

Previously, targets were first discussed in meetings run by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen at the time, with Brennan being just one of the voices in the debate.  The new Joint Chiefs chairman, Gen. Martin Dempsey, has been more focused on shrinking the U.S. military as the Afghan war winds down and less on the covert wars overseas.  With Dempsey less involved, Brennan believed there was an even greater need to draw together different agencies’ viewpoints, showing the American public that al-Qaida targets are chosen only after painstaking and exhaustive debate, the senior administration official said.

But some of the officials carrying out the policy are equally leery of “how easy it has become to kill someone,” one said. The U.S. is targeting al-Qaida operatives for reasons such as being heard in an intercepted conversation plotting to attack a U.S. ambassador overseas, the official said. Stateside, that conversation could trigger an investigation by the Secret Service or FBI.  Defense Department spokesman George Little said the department was “entirely comfortable with the process by which American counterterrorism operations are managed.  The CIA did not respond to a request for comment….

An example of a recent Pentagon-led drone strike was the fatal attack in January on al-Qaida commander Bilal al-Berjawi in Somalia. U.S. intelligence and military forces had been watching him for days. When his car reached the outskirts of Mogadishu, the drones fired a volley of missiles, obliterating his vehicle and killing him instantly. The drones belonged to the elite U.S. Joint Special Operations Command. The British-Lebanese citizen al-Berjawi ended up on the JSOC list after a studied debate run by the Pentagon.

The Defense Department’s list of potential drone or raid targets is about two dozen names long, the officials said. The previous process for vetting them, now mostly defunct, was established by Mullen early in the Obama administration, with a major revamp in the spring of 2011, two officials said.  Drone attacks were split between JSOC and the CIA, which keeps a separate list of targets, though it overlaps with the Pentagon list. By law, the CIA can target only al-Qaida operatives or affiliates who directly threaten the U.S. JSOC has a little more leeway, allowed by statue to target members of the larger al-Qaida network.

Under the old Pentagon-run review, the first step was to gather evidence on a potential target. That person’s case would be discussed over an interagency secure video teleconference, involving the National Counterterrorism Center and the State Department, among other agencies. Among the data taken into consideration: Is the target a member of al-Qaida or its affiliates; is he engaged in activities aimed at the U.S. overseas or at home?  If a target isn’t captured or killed within 30 days after he is chosen, his case must be reviewed to see if he’s still a threat.

The CIA’s process is more insular. Only a select number of high-ranking staff can preside over the debates run by the agency’s Covert Action Review Group, which then passes the list to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center to carry out the drone strikes. The Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, is briefed on those actions, one official said.

Al-Berjawi’s name was technically on both lists — the Pentagon’s and the CIA’s. In areas where both JSOC and the CIA operate, the military task force commander and CIA chief of station confer, together with representatives of U.S. law enforcement, on how best to hit the target. If it’s deemed possible to grab the target, for interrogation or simply to gather DNA to prove the identity of a deceased person, a special operations team is sent, as in the case of the 2009 Navy SEAL raid against al-Qaida commander Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. Nabhan’s convoy was attacked by helicopter gunships, after which the raiders landed and took his body for identification, before burying him at sea.

But if the al-Qaida operative is in transit from Somalia to Yemen by boat, for instance, U.S. security officials might opt to use the Navy to intercept and the FBI to arrest him, officials said.

KIMBERLY DOZIER, Who will drones target? Who in the US will decide?, Associated Press, May 22, 2012

How to Unambiguously Identify Zooming Satellites

U.S. military observers can have trouble identifying satellites whizzing overheard in Earth’s crowded space lanes. A new Pentagon effort aims to find the unique visual signatures of individual satellites for quick identification, regardless of whether such satellites belong to friend or foe. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency hopes such signatures — remotely seen from ground or space sensors — could even help identify different satellites made by the same manufacturer. But it’s not easy. Satellites’ orbits may often change between overhead passes, and it’s getting more difficult to spot individual satellites in a space becoming more crowded with vehicles, satellites and pieces of leftover space junk.

The DARPA solicitation for an innovative solution from small business, issued April 27, noted, “Some objects are frequently lost, and sometimes serendipitously reacquired without recognition of its previous catalog existence, unless manpower-intensive analysis intervenes.”Any effort to reliably track “active payloads and tumbling objects” and the like would focus on finding each satellite’s physical or “operational” signatures (perhaps signals or movements unique to a certain satellite). Timeliness and speed would be crucial for helping military observers quickly identify satellites that had gone missing and possibly reappeared.

The technology needed here likely would involve some sort of software algorithms that can do automated identification based on satellite signatures. Once such software is created, DARPA envisions passing the testing along to the Joint Space Operations Center, the U.S. military’s center for coordinating space forces and directing space power to support global operations.  DARPA’s focus on satellites also includes the recently launched “SeeMe” effort to deploy dozens of cheap satellites that can provide overhead battlefield surveillance for the U.S. military. The Pentagon afency also has the ongoing “Phoenix” project to try to cannibalize dead satellites and use the parts for new “Frankenstein” satellites.

Military wants to know: Whose satellites are those?, MSNBC.com, May, 3, 2012

See also http://www.dodsbir.net/sitis/display_topic.asp?Bookmark=42609

Regulating Satellite Technology Exports; the military and the industry

Satellite export controls should be relaxed by Congress so that U.S. companies can better compete globally for sales of communications and remote-sensing equipment, a report by the Pentagon and State Department found (pdf).  “Limited national security benefits” are provided by a 1998 law (Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84)that applies more stringent controls on satellites than on other equipment that may have both civilian and military uses, the departments said in the report requested by Congress and released today to lawmakers.

The report is “a key step toward relieving U.S. commercial satellite system, component, and part manufacturers of unnecessary controls,” said John Ordway, an export-licensing attorney with Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe LLP in Washington.  Among companies that may benefit are Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC), Boeing Co. (BA), Loral Space & Communications Inc. (LORL), Honeywell International Inc. (HON), L-3 Communications Holdings Inc. (LLL), Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK), Orbital Sciences Corp. (ORB), Moog Inc. (MOG/A) and America Pacific Corp.,….

The report specifies items that should remain on the State Department’s more restrictive munitions licensing lists and those than can be moved to the less restrictive oversight of the Commerce Department’s “Commerce Control List.”The equipment that can be shifted encompasses “hundreds of thousands of items we think U.S. industry should be able to compete” on, Gregory Schulte, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, told reporters on a conference call.

The 1998 law “places the U.S. space industrial base at a distinct competitive disadvantage when bidding against companies from other advanced satellite-exporting countries that have less stringent export control practices and policies,” the report found….

The 1998 law was passed after a congressionally mandated commission headed by Representative Christopher Cox, a California Republican, concluded some U.S. companies gave China access to U.S. technology that may have aided the communist nation’s military missile programs….Industry groups such as the Aerospace Industries Association say the law has stifled U.S. exports. The report today backs that assertion, concluding, ‘‘Over the last 15 years, a substantial number of commercial satellite systems, subsystems and related technologies have become less critical to national security.’’  ‘‘At a time when the budget request for national security space is already slated for a 22 percent reduction, Congress needs to act to ensure the U.S. space industrial base remains viable,’’ AIA President and Chief Executive Officer Marion C. Blakey said.  ‘‘These companies can only sustain our technological edge if they aren’t regulated out of legitimate commercial markets,’’ she said in an e-mailed statement. U.S. manufacturers lost $21 billion in satellite revenue from 1999 to 2009, costing about 9,000 jobs because of the controls, according to her group.

The report emphasizes that the State and Defense departments aren’t advocating a wholesale abandonment of the 1998 law, saying the U.S. ‘‘should maintain strict controls on transfers of ‘‘non-critical’’ items ‘‘that are likely to be used against the U.S. national interest.’’  China’s continuing efforts to acquire U.S. military and dual-use technologies require vigilance, according to the report. That nation’s civilian and military space industry ‘‘are fused together such that reasonable regulators must consider the high likelihood that space-related items and technology will be diverted from a civil use and applied to military programs.”  China recently attempted to acquire a “fully functional, European imaging satellite constellation” that was blocked because it contained U.S. technology, the report found.

Excerpts, Tony Capaccio, Satellite Export Controls Should Be Eased, U.S Says, Bloomberg, Apr 18, 2012

United States Cyber Range, how to replicate the internet to test cyberweapons

Replicating the complexity of thousands of globally interconnected network systems is a challenge faced by researchers developing tools to protect our nation against the growing threat of cyber attacks. Sophisticated attacks as well as adaptive malware have the ability to devastate defense and commercial networks. DARPA was tasked by the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) to “establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing…the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions” (National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD)-54) .

Under the National Cyber Range (NCR) program, DARPA has developed the architecture and software tools for a secure, self-contained testing capability to rapidly emulate large-scale complex networks that match the depth and diversity of real-world networks. The capability, demonstrated at scale with an operational prototype, will enable realistic testing and evaluation of new cyberspace concepts, policies and technologies by the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal entities. DoD’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, released in July 2011, highlights the NCR’s role in DoD’s pursuit of revolutionary cyberspace technologies.

The NCR complements federal cyber testing capabilities by providing rapid and automated configurability and scalability for users across the government. It should provide a 5-10x reduction in the time and cost to test and evaluate new cyber tools while improving confidence in the real-world performance of these tools, a vital feature considering the extremely dynamic and evolving real-world cyber threat. The NCR is designed to allow potentially virulent code to be introduced and tested on the range without compromising the range itself. Additionally, multiple experiments will be able to run on the range simultaneously at different security levels, maximizing the range’s use across government agencies.

The NCR program began in 2009 and has been developed in three phases. The current phase (Phase II-B) will involve operation and beta testing of the prototype range; enhancing existing software tools to ensure that the range hardware and software are stable and to allow for a seamless transition; developing a business model for sustainable range operation beyond fiscal year 2012; and to transition the range and associated technologies to USCYBERCOM and other government organizations.

See DAPRA