Tag Archives: Security Council

The UN Intervention Brigade and Drones in Congo

falco drone. Image wikipedia

The recent approval by the UN Security Council of two extraordinary measures to deal with the situation in that country—the use of drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide reconnaissance (pdf)of militia activity, and the deployment of an intervention brigade to take offensive measures against the militia groups—is being hailed by most observers as a potential turning point in the country’s recent unhappy history. Though the UN has been careful to present the measures as purely temporary and confined to the DRC, they do indeed constitute a turning point in UN peace missions. Their success—if they do succeed—will undoubtedly lead to their being hailed as “best practice,” and radically change the hopeless trajectory of the Congo.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has welcomed the measures as a “comprehensive approach aimed at addressing the root causes of instability in the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region.” But optimism has necessarily to be tempered, analysts believe.   The 24 February 2013 “Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region,” which provides the basis for the intervention brigade, does indeed offer a comprehensive approach to the problem. The framework, which the African Union assisted to put together, was signed in Ethiopia by leaders from the DRC, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, in the presence of Mr. Ban, who acted as one of the guarantors. The framework speaks of the suffering in the country engendered by “recurring cycles of conflict and persistent violence by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign.”

The current path, the framework says, is untenable. It sets out an agenda for the consolidation of state authority and the prevention of outside support to armed groups. It also contains a pledge by the DRC to respect “the legitimate concerns and interests” of neighbouring countries, an implicit reference to Rwanda’s long-held security concerns about the operation of anti-government Hutu militants based in eastern Congo.

Mr. Ban raised the issue of the intervention brigade in the Security Council shortly after his return from Ethiopia last March. He told Security Council members that the envisaged brigade would operate under the command of the UN mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, and would cost $140 million (in addition to the $1.4 billion it costs MONUSCO to maintain 19,815 troops annually). On 27 December, Mr. Ban also wrote to the Security Council requesting approval for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, by MONUSCO for “advanced information collation, analysis and dissemination to enhance situational awareness and to permit timely decision-making.”

On January 22, 2013, the Security Council approved the request to use UAVs in the Congo  [selected vendor is the Italian company SELEX ES. The UAV is known as the “FALCO”] “without prejudice to the ongoing consideration by relevant United Nations bodies of legal, financial and technical implications of the use of unmanned aerial systems.”   The trigger for these measures was the brutal occupation of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in eastern DRC, by the M23 in November of last year. The event was a serious setback to both the Congolese and the UN.  Two days after the fall of Goma, the government suspended its commander of ground forces, Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba, who had been accused several times of atrocities by human rights groups—in addition to being accused by the UN Panel of Experts a few months before of selling weapons and ammunitions to illegal armed groups.  The occupation of Goma underlined two perennial problems: the weakness of the DRC to exist as a nation and the readiness of armed rebel groups to exploit this weakness.

The intervention brigade was approved by UN resolution 2098 of 18 March, 2013, which states that the intervention brigade will be a rapid reaction force that will conduct “targeted offensive operations” against rebel groups in the country.  The brigade, consisting of 3,069 troops, is led by a Tanzanian general, and is organised into three infantry battalions, one artillery unit, one Special Forces unit and a reconnaissance company. Crack troops from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi have already been contributed to it, and its mission is to “prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and disarm them.”

Excerpt, Lansana Gberie, UN peacekeeping task enters a new phase, Africa Renewal, Aug. 2013

International Criminal Court Track Record: targeting Africa’s Dictatators

The International Criminal Court in The Hague is about to open a formal investigation into post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire at the request of the country’s new president, Alassane Ouattara… In Libya Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Africa’s longest-serving leader, is wondering whether he may face the same fate, after the ICC’s chief prosecutor announced that he was seeking three arrest warrants (with names so far undisclosed) for those deemed most responsible for the killing of hundreds of unarmed people since pro-democracy protests began in February….  In The Hague a verdict is expected within months at the trial of Charles Taylor, Liberia’s former president, before a special court dealing with Sierra Leone. In Sudan President Omar al-Bashir is still wary of falling into the ICC’s net, three years after being charged with genocide in his country’s western province of Darfur.

The court’s statutes let it prosecute people for suspected genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in any member state when that state is “unwilling or unable” to do so…[1]This has usually been done at the request of the state itself, as in Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Congo. [2]But it can also investigate atrocities in non-member states at the request of the UN Security Council, if deemed to threaten regional or international peace and security. This is what happened with Darfur, where the Security Council first drew the court’s attention to the atrocities. Now the council has also referred Libya to the court.

This has been a tricky route. Three of the Security Council’s five permanent members—America, Russia and China—did not sign up to the ICC. A threatened veto by just one of them is enough to block a mooted referral. But with Darfur, international alarm over the spreading rape and bloodshed persuaded America and China to abstain rather than oppose Sudan’s referral in 2005. Since then the UN Security Council has sent only one other such case to the court. But the court’s boosters have taken heart from the unanimous vote against Libya in February, arguing that it may mark a milestone in the nine-year-old outfit’s struggle for worldwide acceptance.  Most of the Arab world refuses to accept a court that much of the poor world still sees as a Western-dominated tribunal, intent on holding the have-nots to account while giving impunity to the rich and powerful. Jordan is the ICC’s only Arab member.

These days the ICC’s biggest opponents are in Africa, which provides the court with its biggest group of members (31 out of 114) and is the scene of all the cases currently being investigated or prosecuted: in the CAR, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Sudan and Uganda. Accusing the court of unfairly targeting African countries, the 53-member African Union (AU) is again calling for “African solutions to African problems”. It particularly dislikes the court’s increasing willingness to go after sitting presidents. At its summit next month it plans to extend the authority of its African Court of Justice and Human Rights to cover criminal as well as civil cases. …It may not work. The reason so many African cases are before the court is not because of bias; all the ICC’s cases have been referred to it either by the UN Security Council or by the countries themselves. It is because the standards of justice in Africa are often poor… The ICC was set up as a court of last resort. It may not take on cases if the country concerned has a competent, independent justice system ready to prosecute alleged perpetrators and give them a fair trial. Its statutes say nothing about having to defer to regional courts. Many autocratic African leaders appear ready to protect their erring colleagues from the law in case they may one day need the favour returned…

The ICC’s big weakness, apart from its astronomical cost and drawn-out procedures, is its dependence on others to help arrest suspects. But even this may be changing. South Africa and Botswana have said Mr Bashir is not welcome. Congo has handed over three of its suspects to the court and France a fourth, while Belgium has handed over Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former Congolese vice-president, for alleged atrocities in the CAR. America is actively supporting the hunt for four rebel leaders of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, which continues to wreak havoc in the region. Some suspects, including three Darfuri rebel leaders and six Kenyans, have appeared voluntarily before the court. Five others are in custody, including four on trial. So the court, though still widely regarded in Africa with suspicion and sometimes even derision, may yet prove to have teeth.

Excerpts, International justice in Africa: The International Criminal Court bares its teeth, Economist, May 14, 2011, at 57

Responsibility to Protect or an Excuse for War: Libya

For those who back muscular humanitarian intervention, both the words and deeds of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi provided absolute moral clarity. “Come out of your homes, attack [the opposition] in their dens,” he told his supporters on February 22nd. He called the protesters “cockroaches” and “rats” who did not deserve to live: language chillingly reminiscent of the broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines, which spurred on the perpetrators of Rwanda’s genocide in 1994.

As he spoke, his forces had set their sights on Benghazi, their adversaries’ stronghold. According to Human Rights Watch, a New York-based group, government forces had already killed 233 people in the preceding week. A bloodbath beckoned, in a city of 700,000 people. The United Nations Security Council invoked a fateful formula, urging the regime to meet its “responsibility to protect” its people. On March 17th the council, “expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians”, ordered air strikes.

That set the stage for the first full-blown test of a principle that the UN adopted in 2005 and has been refining since. The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) holds that when a sovereign state fails to prevent atrocities, foreign governments may intervene to stop them. Human-rights advocates say it saves lives. Sceptics see it as too easily misused to be useful: a cover for imperialism, or even an incentive to kill (because even if a massacre is not looming, an unscrupulous warlord might be tempted to engineer one against his own people to spur outside support).

Previous uses of R2P have been solo ventures. In 2008 Russia used it to justify attacking Georgia, and France cited it after the cyclone in Myanmar, implying that humanitarian aid might have to be brought in by force if the regime persisted in stonewalling (it backed down). But before this year, no mission had been authorised by the UN Security Council that so explicitly cited the new principle.

At first it looked likely that the doctrine would either triumph or die in Libya. But two months and thousands of air strikes later, war’s messy reality has merely hardened views on both sides. On one hand, the decision to go to war was made in good faith at a time when the risk of massacres seemed real. As Mats Berdal, a professor at King’s College London, points out, the world’s leading powers had good reason to think they were “avoiding a Srebrenica”—the massacre of Bosnians which UN forces failed to avert in July 1995.  But as the war drags on and NATO strikes more widely, sceptics also feel their case has been bolstered. “For those of us who feared that R2P was just a warrant for war, our fears have been vindicated,” says David Rieff, an advocate-turned-critic….

Colonel Qaddafi provided an all-but-unique test. Regional leaders loathed him and readily dumped him. The Arab League’s support for the intervention stopped Russia and China wielding their vetoes. And the concentration of the rebels in the east, combined with flat desert terrain, at first made the regime’s forces easy bombing targets. “The stars were well and truly aligned in the Libya case,” says Mr Evans. “All the criteria were satisfied.”  The immediate goal of protecting Benghazi from massacre was achieved within days. Having destroyed Libya’s air defences, Western bombers and missiles pummelled the advancing troops into a speedy retreat…Protecting all Libyans, not just those in the east, would require the end of Colonel Qaddafi’s rule—an outcome that both Western and Arab governments had already called for. NATO stepped up its military campaign, bombing retreating columns as well as advancing ones, and attacking command-and-control centres frequented by Colonel Qaddafi and his family. On April 30th an air strike killed one of his sons. The line between curbing atrocities and an air war for regime change blurred—though a land operation is ruled out, for the moment.

Excerpt, Responsibility to protect: The lessons of Libya, Economist, May 21, 2011, at 67